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ABSTRACT
Economists have been reluctant to rely on culture as a possible determinant of economic phenomena.
The notion of culture is so broad and the channels through which it can enter the economic discourse
so vague that it is difficult to design testable hypotheses. In this paper we show this does need to be
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Until recently, economists have been reluctant to rely on culture as a possible 
determinant of economic phenomena. Much of this reluctance stems from the very notion 
of culture: it is so broad and the channels through which it can enter the economic 
discourse so ubiquitous (and vague) that it is difficult to design testable (i.e., refutable) 
hypotheses. Without testable hypotheses, however, there is no role for culture in 
economics except perhaps as a selection mechanism among multiple equilibria (Greif, 
1994, 2005). In recent years, however, better techniques and more data have made it 
possible to identify systematic differences in people’s preferences and beliefs and to 
relate them to various measures of cultural legacy.  These developments suggest an 
approach to introduce cultural-based explanations that can be tested and are able to 
substantially enrich our understanding of economic phenomena. This paper summarizes 
this approach and its achievement so far, outlining at the end directions for future 
research.    
The necessary step to achieve these goals is to define culture in a sufficiently 
narrow way that makes it easier to identify a causal link from culture to economic 
outcomes. For this reason, we define culture as those customary beliefs and values that 
ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to 
generation. While not comprehensive, this definition focuses on those dimensions of 
culture that can impact economic outcomes. In addition, by restricting the potential 
channels of influence to two standard ones -beliefs (i.e, priors) and values (i.e, 
preferences)-, this definition provides an approach to identify a causal effect from culture 
to economic outcomes.  
The first step in this approach is to show a direct impact of culture on 
expectations and preferences. Most studies surveyed in this paper use survey data, 
although experimental evidence has also been used to establish this connection (like 
Henrich et al., 2001; Bornhorst et al., 2005).  
The second step is to show that those beliefs and preferences have an impact on 
economic outcomes. In one of the examples we provide in this paper, for instance, we 
first show that different religious affiliations and ethnic background are associated with 
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redistribution affect actual redistribution in state-level fiscal policy in the U.S.   
To claim a causal link, however, a third step is necessary. All work on culture and 
economics faces the problem that causality is likely to go both ways -- from culture to 
economics and from economics to culture.  The above definition of culture suggests an 
answer: to focus only on those dimensions of culture that are inherited by an individual 
from previous generations, rather than voluntarily accumulated. As Becker (1996, p. 16) 
writes:  “Individuals have less control over their culture than over other social capital. 
They cannot alter their ethnicity, race or family history, and only with difficulty can they 
change their country or religion. Because of the difficulty of changing culture and its low 
depreciation rate, culture is largely a ‘given’ to individuals throughout their lifetimes.”  
Moreover, religious practices, even when they respond to economic conditions, are 
modified over time only at centuries or even millennium frequency (see, for example, 
Botticini and Eckstein, 2005). In this spirit, we restrict our attention in this paper to those 
cultural aspects like religion and ethnic background that can largely be treated as 
invariant over an individual’s lifetime. 
This choice allows us to isolate the cultural component of beliefs and preferences 
by instrumenting them with their cultural determinants (for example, when we analyze 
the preferences for redistribution we use as instruments religion and ethnicity). This third 
and last step is legitimate if culture impacts the economic outcome only through the 
channel assumed in the regression. While this condition is unlikely to be met in many 
applications, it is in some (e.g., Tabellini, 2005).
1   
The advantage of this three-step procedure is that it prevents cultural explanations 
from becoming simple ex post rationalizations. By tracing the effect of culture through 
the economic channels it is supposed to affect, this approach reduces the risk of spurious 
correlations. Its ultimate validity, however, resides in its ability to enhance our 
understanding of economic behavior.   
                                                 
1 This is not the only possible method. Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004), for instance, use a structural 
estimation approach. 
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differentiates this approach from the social interaction literature surveyed by Manski 
(2000), which focuses on the peer group effects that can be viewed as the fast-moving 
component of culture. In treating culture as inherited by individuals, we are not denying 
the possibility that long-standing cultural traditions are the result of a society-wide 
optimization process (see, for example, the economic analysis of dowries in Botticini and 
Siow, 2003), but simply that culture is not continually altered in step with the changes 
that individuals experience during their lifetimes. Emigrants from southern, low-trust, 
regions in Italy, for instance, tend to carry with them their mistrust to their new locations 
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004a). Similarly, people who are raised religiously 
exhibit some common beliefs and preferences, even if they reject religion as adults 
(Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003).   
Why do some cultural influences change so slowly (Roland, 2005)? While a full 
answer is outside the scope of this work, we conjecture three explanations. First, parents 
have a natural tendency to teach their children what they have learned from their own 
parents, without a full reassessment of the current optimality of those beliefs (Bisin and 
Verdier, 2000). An example of this persistence is the Mursi people’s tradition that women 
wear large lip ornaments made of clay that disfigure their lips and force them to remove 
some of their frontal teeth. While today’s Mursi have lost the reason for this tradition 
(some claim it was introduced to make women less interesting to slave traders; see 
Gordon, 2003), it is still maintained to this day. Thus, even if cultural norms were 
efficient when they were introduced, they might continue to be taught even after they 
have become inefficient (Grusec and Kuczynski, 1997).  
Second, organizations that play a role promoting culture – including state, church, 
and academia -- might have a vested interest in promoting the continuation of any beliefs 
that provide them with rents.  Female infibulations, for instance, is still widespread in 
many parts of the world in spite not only of the physical pain imposed on women, but 
also of the reduced fertility it engenders (Almroth et al. , 2005) for the power it gives to 
men. 
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output, but greater outcomes in terms of higher fertility, and such norms can become 
more widespread in the population despite their economic inefficiency.  
Whatever the explanation for the delayed adjustment process of culture, it enables 
us to use deeper aspects of culture like the ethnic origin or the religious denomination  as 
exogenous variables and thus reduce the risks of the reverse causality problem in 
regressions that explore the impact of culture on economic outcomes.  
The next section of this paper provides an abbreviated overview of the historical 
debates on the relationship between economics and culture. The following two sections 
review the evidence and arguments on how deep aspects of culture like ethnic 
background or religion, acting through beliefs or preferences, can affect economic 
outcomes. Sometimes the effect of culture goes through both these channels at the same 
time, as it is the case for social capital. We discuss this in the last section.  
 
Historical Perspectives on Economics and Culture 
The origin of the debate 
Classical economists were comfortable in using cultural explanations for 
economic phenomena. Adam Smith viewed his A Theory of Moral Sentiments as an 
integral part to the “Wealth of Nations”. And John Stuart Mill regarded cultural 
constraints as sometimes more important than even the pursuits of personal interest (see 
“System of Logic,”1843, p. 484).  
Karl Marx inverted this direction of causality: rather than culture determining 
economic relations, he argued that the underlying technology determines the type of 
social structure prevailing and even the dominant culture: the hand-mill produces feudal 
society and the steam-mill capitalism. In a famous passage in his preface to “A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” Marx (1859) writes:  
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are 
indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which 
correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. 
The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure 
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and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of 
production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life 
process in general.
2 
Whereas Marx saw religion as a byproduct of production relations, Max Weber 
(1905) regarded religion as crucial to the development of capitalism. Any new economic 
order – argued Weber – faces initial resistance. Economic incentives are not sufficient to 
motivate entrepreneurs to break apart from the pre-existing order. However, Weber 
argued that the Protestant Reformation taught that the pursuit of wealth should be 
regarded not merely as an advantage, but as a duty. This religious anointment gave the 
bourgeoisie the moral strength to subvert the previous order and create a new one, based 
on the organization of free wage-earners for the purpose of economic profit.   
An original synthesis between Marx’s view of historical evolution and Weber’s is 
provided by Antonio Gramsci. While Marxist, Gramsci recognizes the role played by 
culture in history. Power is not merely domain but hegemony, i.e. the ability to influence 
society morally and intellectually. In the class struggle, thus, workers can gain consensus 
in other social groups by imparting their world view and system of values to other 
classes. Cultural hegemony, i.e. the control of the intellectual life of society by purely 
cultural means, is crucial to political dominance. Hence, Gramsci (1949) thinks that not 
only economic interests but also the dominant culture can explain political outcomes, a 
link we are going to study empirically in Section 3.  
Karl Polanyi agreed with Max Weber (1905) that religion was important to the 
establishment of markets, but also viewed religion and culture as a factor in moderating 
the excesses of the market. In a famous passage, Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson (1957, 
p. 250) write: “The human economy … is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, 
economic and non-economic. The inclusion of the noneconomic is vital. For religion or 
                                                 
2 Some recent interpreters of Marx caution against an excessively mechanistic interpretation of his view of 
the historical process, and point out that even orthodox Marxism reserves a role for culture in human 
history and on economic choices (for example, Kolakowski, 1978). Nonetheless, after Marx the problem of 
two-way causality between culture and economics was clearly on the table and generated a very active 
debate, often with an emphasis on the interaction between culture and institutions.  
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monetary institutions or the availability of tools and machines themselves that lighten the 
toil of labor.”  
Economic Imperialism   
In the decades immediately after World War II, the work of Gramsci and Polanyi 
was enormously influential in political science and sociology (see the excellent survey by 
DiMaggio, 1994), but fell on deaf ears among economists.  
As economic theory increased its mathematical sophistication and the set of tools 
at its disposal expanded, no need was felt to introduce other potential explanatory 
variables that, on top, were hard to measure.  Not only did economics lose any interest in 
its relation with culture, but, as it became more self-confident in its own capabilities, it 
moved to explain culture as a mere outcome of economic forces.  
This movement, which is mostly associated with the Chicago school, is very 
Marxian in spirit. But there is no trace of class struggle. To the contrary, the Chicago 
school pursues a “rational” Marxian agenda, where people beliefs, tastes, and values are 
individual or societal’s rational choices and any element of conflict can be resolved 
through the price system.   
It is during this period that Muth (1961) and Lucas (1976) endogenize beliefs, 
arguing that individuals’ priors should coincide with the objective distribution of the 
model. At the same time, Stigler and Becker (1977) endogenize consumers’ preferences, 
starting from a common utility and assuming different degree of investment.  Finally, 
Iannaccone (1988) and Coleman (1990) begin to interpret religious and social norms as 
the result of a group-level optimization. This approach spawned a large literature that 
endogenizes many cultural aspects. For example, Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) 
extend human capital investment theory to investment in social skills and social 
interactions by individuals. In this approach, the returns from investing in local networks 
are higher the lower the probability of moving and the greater the number of remaining 
years of life span.   
  7In this intellectually coherent body of work, it was very difficult to find any space 
for an independent role of culture. In fact, the only possible role is as a coordinating 
device, leading societies playing the exact same game to different focal points. This is the 
role of culture in Greif (1994, 2005), who explains the different societal organization of 
the Genoese and Maghribi traders as the culturally driven response to the same economic 
problem.   
The non-economists 
During this period, while some non traditional economists such as Hirschman continued 
to link economic analysis to cultural factors (e.g, Hirschman, 1967), the most interesting 
work on the causal effect of culture on economic and political outcomes was undertaken 
by non-economists. For space considerations, we will focus here only on the contribution 
of a few researchers, who later became particularly influential among economists.  
Banfield (1958) is the first to propose a cultural explanation for 
underdevelopment. In “The Moral Basis of a Backward Society” he attributes the 
underdevelopment of southern Italy to the excessive pursuit of narrow self interest by its 
inhabitants, a condition he labels “amoral familism.” Following Banfield, Putnam (1993) 
provides very interesting evidence of the positive effects of a more altruistic (“civic”) 
culture on the quality of political institutions. The national government in Italy 
introduced formally identical systems of regional government across the country. As 
Putnam shows, in areas that experienced free city states in the Middle Age, the level of 
what Putnam calls “social capital” is high and regional governments functioned much 
better. In areas that lacked that tradition, regional governments performed very poorly.
3 
Fukuyama (1995) directly relates trust to economic development. He does not 
                                                 
3  The north and the south of Italy differ in many respects: geographically (the South is much more 
mountainous), logistically (communications are more difficult in the South), economically (traditionally the 
South has been characterized by latifunds cultivated with wheat or used to graze sheep, while the North by 
smaller plot cultivated with more value added crops).  How can we be sure that this difference across these 
regions derives from a distant episode in history and not from all these other factors? Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (in progress) try to disentangle these alternative hypotheses. To reduce other confounding effects, 
they exploit the differences in history across towns within the center-north of Italy to identify the effect of 
the free-city state experience from the rest. They find that several measures of a town’s social capital are 
positively related to the length of the city-state experience of that town. This finding confirms Putnam’s 
earlier argument, that historical experience carries consequences centuries later.    
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a consequence of economic development) and the cultural component of trust.  
The explosion of work on economic institutions in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
encouraged economists to go beyond formal institutions into informal institutions, which 
took them to an explicit consideration of culture. Institutionally-oriented economists like 
Landes (1998) emphasized both the links from culture to beliefs and values and from 
beliefs and values to economic outcomes, but with an argument presented in a detailed 
narrative form rather than with statistical evidence. Landes revisits the fundamental 
question of what drives the success of national economies and concludes in favor of 
attitudes driven by cultural factors. These cultural factors - thrift, hard work, tenacity, 
honesty, and tolerance- contrast with the xenophobia, religious intolerance, bureaucratic 
corruption, and state edicts that stifle enterprise. His judgment (p. 516) is that "if we learn 
anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture makes all the 
difference. (Here Max Weber was right on.)"   
Toward a new cultural economics?   
The opening through which culture entered the economic discourse was the concept of 
trust. Following the political scientists (Banfield, Putnam, Fukuyama), economists 
(Knack and Keefer, 1996, La Porta et al., 1997) started to study the economic payoff of 
trust. The appealing feature of trust is that it can be thought of as “the subjective 
probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will 
perform a particular action” (Gambetta, 2000), and as such can be easily incorporated 
into standard economic models. 
   As a cultural variable, however, trust has severe limitations.  Trust is not just an 
inherited cultural variable. People can develop trust because of the quality of the legal 
system or as the result of strategic interactions (Axelrod, 1984).  Trust can even be the 
result of optimal investment in social capital (Glaeser, Laibson, Sacerdote, 2002). 
Moreover, culture can impact economic outcomes through mechanisms other than trust. 
Thus, subsequent work tried to establish a more direct link between culture and economic 
outcomes.   
  9In what follows we present this work (as well as new evidence) distinguishing 
between the two main channels through which culture can affect economic outcomes: 
beliefs and preferences. In doing so, we maintain the standard economic assumption that 
each individual has one identity and maximizes the utility of this identity. We only 
assume that cultural upbringing can affect his priors or the parameters of his utility. A 
richer way to capture the effects of culture (but also one that will increase the 
endogeneity problem) is to consider the possibility of multiple identities (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000) and the role of culture in shaping these identities and making one versus 
another salient.   
    
2. Culture, Prior Beliefs and Economic Outcomes 
People make many decisions in life in which they lack previous experience: which 
college to attend, which profession to undertake, how much to save for retirement. In 
these situations, choices must be based on prior beliefs. But how are these prior beliefs 
determined?  Culture might play a big role here.  
The Effect of Culture on Prior Beliefs 
Economics does not have much to say about priors. In fact, it is standard to 
assume that individuals have common priors, not because economists believe it, but 
because they must overcome the objection that it would be too easy (and thus vacuous) to 
explain economic phenomena on the basis of different priors chosen ad hoc.   
Fortunately, in recent years the growing availability of direct information on 
people’s beliefs allows the choice of priors to be based on empirical observation. It is 
possible to test, for instance, whether religious and ethnic backgrounds affect people’s 
priors.   
In Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003), we looked at the effect of religion on 
trust around the world using the World Values Survey. Our dependent variable is a 
dummy equal to 1 if an individual replies “Most people can be trusted” to the question 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have to 
be very careful in dealing with people?". The coefficients of interest regard dummy 
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“no religious affiliation”). The regression also includes demographic controls for health, 
gender, age, education, social class, and income as well as country fixed-effects, and 
dummy variables for different survey years and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person 
does not believe in God (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003, Table 4, offer more 
details).  
Being raised religiously raises the level of trust by 2 percent. If a person regularly 
attends religious services, the level of trust increases by another 20 percent. This effect 
differs across denominations; while Catholic and Protestant have roughly a similar 
positive effect, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist do not.  
In this paper, we replicate the same exercise within the United States, based on 
data from the General Social Survey. Unfortunately, religious classifications in the 
General Social Survey are not as detailed as in the World Values Survey (only three 
religious denominations are identifiable). The General Social Survey, however, measures 
ethnic origin of the respondent’s ancestors and allow us to study whether the culture 
transmitted by ancestors migrated from different countries plays a role in the beliefs of 
people living in the US. The effect of different religions on trust is similar to our previous 
study, albeit not statistically significant. By contrast, the U.S. data shows a strong effect 
of ethnic origin (see Figure 2); these effects are computed relative to Americans with 
British descendents. Taking the ancestors’ country-of-origin dummies as a group, they 
are jointly statistically significant; which implies that the level of trust an American has 
toward others depends in part upon where ancestors originated.  
Ancestors’ origin dummies also have a clear pattern: the effect on trust is strong 
when ancestors come from countries that today have a higher average level trust.  In 
Figure 3, we plot the estimated impact of having ancestors from different areas of the 
world – again, this is measured vis-a-vis having British ancestors -- against the difference 
between the level of trust that prevails today in those areas minus the average level of 
trust in Great Britain from the World Values Survey. There is a strong positive 
correlation (0.6) between the two. This finding is consistent with the idea that priors have 
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individual beliefs even in the new environment and even several generations later. 
The biggest problem with these correlations is one of causality. In GSZ (2003) we 
try to address it in two ways. First, we show that these effects are present even for people 
that were raised religiously, independent of whether they continue to profess the faith 
afterwards. Since one does not choose his parents or his parents’ religion, the reverse 
causality argument does not apply here. Second, we look at one episode in history where 
there was a discontinuous change in religious doctrine and study the impact of this on 
people beliefs. This change was brought about by the Second Vatican Council, which in 
1962 substantially modified Catholic doctrine and teaching. Not only was the use of Latin 
in the Mass abolished, but also there was an opening up of dialogue with the other 
religious denominations. As a result, Catholics after 1960 received a very different 
education from their older peers. If these changes indeed affected the influence of 
Catholicism, we should see a difference in the effect of Catholicism on the older versus 
the younger generation. To control for generic cohort differences we insert a dummy for 
people born after 1960 into the basic regression and then interact this dummy with the 
different levels of religiosity of Catholics. Catholics brought up after Vatican II are 
indeed more trusting and tolerant. This result it is hard to explain just with the argument 
that religion practice responds to secularism, because the dummy for people borne after 
1960 should already capture this effect.   
Another potential difficulty with findings of this sort is that it may be difficult to 
separate culturally-based beliefs from rational expectations. Suppose that we observe (as 
it is indeed the case) that Swedes trust others more. Is this trust culturally driven or is it 
the rational prior driven by the different level of trustworthiness prevailing in the country 
the interviewed person is living in?  In general, it is hard to tell. In some special cases, 
however, it is possible to distinguish among the two. 
 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004b) use Eurobarometer surveys where 
individuals from various European countries are asked how much they trust individuals 
from all the other European countries. In particular, the data allow us to identify three 
components of trust: the average level of trust Swedes have towards others, the average 
level of trust citizens of other countries have toward Swedes and an idiosyncratic 
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data allow us to compare how the Swedish view about Germans differs from other 
countries’ view about Germans.  We find that this idiosyncratic component of trust 
increases when two countries share the same religion and decreases when they have a 
long history of wars. It also decreases with the genetic distance between two populations 
(a measure not only of somatic similarity, but also of similarity in ancient cultural 
aspects).
4  This dependence of trust (and thus of a prior belief) on cultural variables 
weakens for more educated people, suggesting that education can reduce the role of these 
inherited cultural aspects in the formation of priors.  
Another way to show that culture can affect beliefs is to conduct experiments. 
Henrich et al. (2001) compare the responses to ultimatum games across different tribes. 
In an ultimatum game a player proposes how to divide a sum of money with another 
player. If the second player rejects the proposed allocation, neither gets anything. If the 
second accepts, the first gets their demand and the second gets the rest. While the 
economists’ optimal offer is arbitrarily close to zero, in almost all the experiments people 
offer more. Henrich et al. (2001) show that the average offer varies systematically across 
tribes (from a minimum of 26% for the Machiguenga tribe in Peru to a maximum of 58% 
for the Lamelara tribe in Indonesia) in a way that is correlated with the prevailing 
occupation of a tribe. Tribes whose basic subsistence activities required larger economies 
of scale and thus higher level of cooperation offered more. On the one hand, these 
findings vindicate Marx’s claim that the structure of production determines the beliefs 
and more broadly the culture of a society. On the other hand, they suggest that once 
culture is formed, it persists and impacts economic relations beyond those which formed 
them.   
An even more compelling experiment of the effect of cultural biases on beliefs is 
performed by Hoff and Priyanka (2005). They show that caste differences can affect 
individual performance by impacting individuals' expectations. When Indian kids were 
asked to solve mazes and caste was not publicly revealed, there were no caste differences 
                                                 
4 In a follow up work, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) show that genetic distance is also related with the 
difference in income across countries. Consistent with trust being important, they interpret this effect as 
cultural differences representing a barrier to the diffusion of innovation.   
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fact that low-caste subjects expect that others will judge them prejudicially and this 
mistrust undermines motivation.  
When experiments are not feasible, one can still document a cultural bias in 
beliefs by showing that differences in beliefs across different culturally-distinguished 
groups do not correspond to objective differences in the underlying distribution of 
outcomes, but only to perceived differences. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) pioneer this 
method by showing that Americans have a very different perception of social mobility 
than the Europeans, but this different perception is not matched by the data.
5    
   The effects of priors on economic outcomes  
Having shown that culture as defined by religion and ethnicity affects beliefs 
about trust, we now want to show that these beliefs have an impact on economic 
outcomes. As Arrow (1972) wrote, “Virtually every commercial transaction has within 
itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time.” 
Several empirical papers show that the level of trust of a community affects economic 
performance (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1996; Knack and Zak, 2001). These papers report 
direct regressions of trust on economic performance but do not dig deeper into the 
mechanism through which measured trust is positively correlated with growth or GDP 
per capita. 
Trust can affect people’s economic decisions in several ways. Trust is particularly 
relevant when transactions involve some unknown counterpart like a buyer or seller of 
goods in another country, when the transaction takes place over a period of time rather 
than being completed on the spot, and when the legal protection is imperfect.   
International trade is then an area where trust should matter. Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2004a) use data on relative trust among European countries to study whether 
and how important trust is for international bilateral trade among these countries. 
Looking at trade in goods, financial assets, and direct foreign investment, they find that 
                                                 
5 An alternative interpretation of this fact is provided by Benabou and Tirole (2006). They build a model 
where there is complementarity between individual ideological choices. Strong beliefs in the fairness of the 
system pays less in a world in which there is strong fiscal redistribution.  Hence, the emergence of two 
equilibria: an “American” one with low taxes and  strong beliefs in fairness and a “European” one with 
high takes and lower beliefs in fairness.    
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exchange more goods and financial assets with it, and to engage more in direct 
investment. These results hold after controlling for the typical variables the trade 
literature has focused on (distance, common borders, commonality of language) as well 
as for variables that have been ignored until recently in the trade literature, such as the 
differences in legal origin among country pairs. These cultural biases are so rooted that 
they affect even the equity portfolio allocation of professional equity funds investors.
6  
  To show the power of this approach and the pervasive impact of culture in many 
economic choices, we carried out some regressions using beliefs about trust to predict 
economic outcomes. As a dependent variable we use the choice of whether to become an 
entrepreneur. When contracts are incomplete, many deals are made just by shaking 
hands, which means relying on trust. An entrepreneur who works in a much unstructured 
environment is more exposed to these types of deals. Hence, trustworthy individuals will 
have a comparative advantage in becoming entrepreneurs. Since whether an individual 
expresses trust is highly correlated with whether that individual is trustworthy (Glaeser 
et. al., 2000), we use our measure of trust as a measure of trustworthiness and study its 
impact on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. We measure the choice of being 
an entrepreneur with a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent says that he or she is self-
employed in the General Social Survey data and zero otherwise. ‘Trust” is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the respondent answered that most people can be trusted in 
response to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can't be too careful in life?” We also use control variables for gender, 
race, age and education. 
As Table 1 reports, trust has a positive and statistically significant impact on the 
probability of becoming an entrepreneur in an ordinary least squares regression (the 
                                                 
6  In response to concerns about reverse causality, one can use instrumental variables like the history of 
wars between the country pairs, genetic distance, and religious similarity to forecast cultural differences, 
and then see how these predicted cultural differences affect economic outcomes. The instrumental variable 
approach often increases the predicted impact of culture on economic outcomes. Some examples are 
provided in the text below.  
 
  15probit results are very similar). Trusting others increases the probability of being a self 
employed by 1.3 percentage points (14 percent of the sample mean).  
One possible concern with this result is the direction of causality: if success 
breeds trust, then a successful entrepreneur might be more trusting, and not the other way 
around. To address this problem we use instrumental variables of religion and ethnic 
origin. In the two-stage least squares, instrumental variable approach, our first stage is to 
treat trust as a dependent variable and use dummy variables for Protestant, Catholic, 
Jewish and other religions, as well as a dummies for the ancestors’ country of origin, as 
the independent variables. In the second stage, we then plug in the predicted values of 
trust for each individual as our regression with entrepreneurship as the dependent 
variable. This approach is intended to capture only the component of trust that is driven 
by the religious and ethnic background.  
Table 1 shows that the coefficient of trust using this instrumental variables 
approach is significantly bigger than the coefficient using the ordinary least squares 
approach, suggesting that reverse causality is not a major problem. The remarkable 
difference in the size of the coefficients, however, suggests that either our proxy for 
trustworthiness is very noisy or that culture might affect the choice of becoming an 
entrepreneur also through other channels. For instance, perhaps cultural background 
affects attitudes towards risk, which in turn affect the choice to become entrepreneur. In 
either case, however, these results support the hypothesis that cultural background plays a 
role in important economic choices.   
Reduced Form Approach  
In many instances direct information about beliefs is not available; hence the researcher 
is forced to jump straight from cultural differences to economic outcomes. An example of 
work with this weakness is our own paper showing that the level of social capital affects 
the use of basic financial instruments, such as writing a check or purchasing of a share 
(Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004a). Similarly, Osili and Paulson (2004) find that U.S. 
immigrants from countries with poorer investment protections are more reluctant to buy 
shares, consistent with them extrapolating their country-of-origin prior to the new 
  16environment.
7 Finally, Barro and McCleary (2002, 2003) show that some religious beliefs 
(such as beliefs in heaven or hell) have positive impact on economic growth.  
  In isolation, this work is less convincing, because it is unable to document the 
intermediate step. But it is useful in conjunction with other work, which gives credibility 
to the link. For example, by using Dutch micro data Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2005) 
show that individual level of trust does indeed affect stock market participation, 
validating the channel assumed in the two above papers.   
3. Culture, Preferences or Values, and Economic Outcomes 
Through the socialization process, by which it is maintained and transmitted, 
culture affects individual’s values. We distinguish between values that influence 
economic preferences (such as fertility or labor participation preferences) – which can be 
thought of as parameters of a person’s utility function -- and political preferences (such as 
preferences for fiscal redistribution). Culture, thus, can affect economic outcomes though 
both these channels. 
The effect of culture on economic preferences 
The set of preferences economically relevant that can be affected by culture is potentially 
very large. Giuliano (2004) shows that living arrangements of US families are affected 
not only by economic conditions, but also by cultural heritage (for example the structure 
of the family in their country of origin). Similarly, Fernández Olivetti and Fogli (2004) 
and Fernández and Fogli (2005) show that cultural heritage affects work and fertility 
choices of American women. Finally, Ichino and Maggi (2000) document that in Italy 
preferences for shirking on the job are driven by a place of birth, which can be interpreted 
as a proxy for the cultural background. 
All these papers, however, take a reduced form approach. In order to document 
the preference channel though which culture affects preferences, here we focus on saving 
decisions. We documented the link between religion and preference for thriftiness in 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003). We infer this preference from the answers to a 
question from the World Value Survey: “Here is a list of qualities that children can be 
                                                 
7 Similarly, Morse and Shive (2004) find that the degree of patriotism of a country (subjective beliefs in 
how great your country is) influences its portfolio diversification choices.    
  17encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?” 
We coded the variable as 1 if the respondent lists as important ‘‘Thrift, saving money and 
things.’’ We regress this variable on several dummy variables for various religious 
affiliations, with the omitted category being “no religious affiliation.” The regressions 
also include controls variables for health, gender, age, education, social class, income, a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a person does not believe in God, country fixed effects, 
dummy variables for the year in which the survey was done. 
We found that Catholics are 3.8 percent more likely and Protestants 2.7 percent 
more likely than nonreligious people to view teaching thrift to their children as an 
important value, and these differences are significant respectively at the 1 and percent 
level.  The effects of other religions are often larger in magnitude, but not statistically 
significant. For example, Buddhists are 7.2 percent more likely to place importance on 
teaching thrift than the nonreligious, Hindus are 7.2 percent more likely, and Jewish 
respondents are 6.4 percent more likely.  The counterexample is that Muslims place 
essentially the same value on teaching thrift to children as the non-religious, although this 
effect is not statistically significant, either.   
From individual preferences to economic outcomes  
            Do these cultural differences in individual preference over the value of teaching 
thriftiness have an actual impact on savings across countries?
  The World Value Survey 
has no data on individuals’ savings or consumption; hence we cannot test whether the 
preferences over teaching thriftiness affect individual savings decisions directly. Thus, 
we turn to national data on saving.  In the first column of Table 2, we use the standard 
economic specification of saving implied by the life-cycle theory. The dependent variable 
is a country’s saving rate, measured as national saving divided by GDP. The explanatory 
variables are growth in per capita income, the dependency ratio (that is, the population 
above 65 and below 15 divided by the total population), and government savings.
8 These 
variables all have the sign predicted by the life cycle theory and are statistically 
significant: more growth leads to higher savings, more dependency less savings, and 
                                                 
8  We use the same data as Giavazzi et al. (2000) who also include a dummy variable for whether the 
country is an OECD member. When we include this variable, the coefficient on the dummy variable is not 
significant and our other results are unchanged, so we do not report these regressions here.  
  18more Government savings leads to more total savings. Together these variables can 
explain 58 percent of the cross-country variability in the rate of savings.  
In the second column we insert the percentage of people in each country who says 
that it is important to teach thriftiness to children. This proportion enters positively and 
significantly. A 10 percentage points increase in the share of people who think thriftiness 
is a value to be taught to children is linked to a 1.3 percentage point increase in the 
national saving rate. This variable increases the R-squared by 5.5 percentage points. 
   A remarkable insight emerges from these findings. The explanatory power of a 
cultural explanation for national saving is quite comparable in size to the power of the 
celebrated life cycle model. An increase of one standard deviation in the share of people 
who think educating children to thriftiness increases the saving rate by 1.8 percentage 
point increase in the national saving rate (9 percent of the sample mean). Increasing the 
growth rate of income by one standard deviation raises national savings by 1.8 percentage 
points, while lowering the dependency ratio by one standard deviation increases national 
saving by 3.18 percentage points. This result suggests that to understand cross-country 
differences in national savings rates cultural variables are as important as economic ones.   
Again, concerns arise over the possibility of reverse causality. For example, 
perhaps people who save a lot also teach this to their children as a rationalization of their 
own behavior.  Thus, in the first step of the instrumental variables process, we use the 
importance of encouraging children to learn thrift as a dependent variable, and use the 
proportion of people of the different religious denomination in each country as the 
instrumental explanatory variables. This process is meant to capture how much of the 
importance of teaching thrift to children can be explained by religious background.  We 
then take the predicted values of thrift based on the coefficients of the instrumental 
variable regression, and insert them back into a regression like the one in the second 
column of Table 2.  The results are shown in the third column. 
With this instrumental variable approach, the impact of the importance of 
teaching thriftiness to children on savings doubles in size, although the statistical 
  19significance weakens from the 5 percent to the 10 percent level.
9 The large increase in the 
estimated coefficient casts some doubt on the validity of the instrument, especially in 
light of the low explanatory power of the first stage regression. While using individual 
data and controlling for country fixed effects shows that different religion denominations 
have a strong impact on the teaching of thriftiness, this impact weakens significantly in 
the cross-country regressions. Hence, the IV estimate should be viewed as tentative.  
A similar approach but at the micro level is followed by Knowles and Postlewaite 
(2004). By using the PSID, not only do they document that parents’ and children saving 
behavior is correlated, but they also show that this behavior is correlated to their stated 
preference on planning horizons.   
The effect of culture on political preferences   
    Culture can also affect behavior and outcomes through its effect on political 
preferences of individuals about what governments should do: for example, how much 
government should intrude in economic life, promote competition, regulate the market, 
redistribute income, run a social security program, or nationalize certain industries and 
businesses.  
Figure 4 shows the impact of religious affiliation on the preferences for 
redistribution of American citizens. To identify these preferences we use the following 
question contained in the General Social Survey: “Some people think the government in 
Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, 
perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the 
poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this 
income differences between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. 
Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income 
differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should 
not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score comes closest to what 
                                                 
9  We also carried out estimates using inflation-adjusted national saving rates. The magnitude and statistical 
significance of the results remain unchanged.   
 
  20you feel?” We recoded the answers so that a higher value means that the respondent 
agrees that the government should involve itself more in redistribution. 
We used this opinion data as the dependent variable in a regression. The key 
independent variables were dummy variables for different religions – Catholic, Jewish, 
Protestant, and Others – leaving “no religion and atheists” as the omitted group. As usual 
throughout this paper, we included control variables for health, gender, education, and 
race. Catholics, Protestant and Jewish respondents all have a more negative attitude 
toward redistribution than those with no religion, although the coefficient on Jewish 
respondents is not statistically significant. Followers of other religions are more in favor 
of redistribution, albeit the effect is not statistically different from zero.  
Figure 5 repeats the same exercise, except instead of using the dummy variables 
for religion, in this case we use dummy variables differentiating by the country of origin 
of the ancestors. The omitted group is Americans of British origin. Americans with 
known African ancestors and generically all African Americans are 20 percent more in 
favor of redistribution than the typical American of British origin. Remember, these 
results hold true even after controlling for whether the respondent is white, as well as for 
the other demographic variables like income, education, gender, age, and health status. 
The second group more in favor of redistribution is the American with Canadian origin, 
with the Hispanic and the American Indian following close behind. The least in favor of 
redistribution are the Japanese Americans, who are less in favor of redistribution than the 
British Americans, although this results is not statistically significant.   
One interpretation of these results is that Americans with British, North European 
or German ancestors are earlier immigrants. Hence, more generations were raised in the 
United States and forged by its culture, absorbing the belief that the success is mostly 
determined by individual actions, which makes government intervention highly 
undesirable. By contrast, those from other areas are comparatively more open to 
redistribution. But whatever the exact interpretation for each region, the country-of-origin 
dummies capture many dimensions of the received culture.  
From political preferences to economic outcomes  
  21 Will these preferences about redistribution affect the government’s level of 
redistributive policies? Some work has investigated this question. Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004) document a strong positive correlation between the proportion of people who 
believe poverty is society’s fault (or that luck determines income) and that country’s 
share of GDP spent in social welfare.  However, they attribute these differences in beliefs 
to political indoctrination, and do not investigate possible cultural determinants. Alesina 
and La Ferrara (2001) rely, as we do, on the General Social Survey and show that those 
who express a preference for equal opportunities are more averse to redistributive 
policies. They are not concerned, however, with the link between these preferences and 
outcomes.
10     
   To show how cultural determinants of beliefs also affect the actual involvement 
of a government in redistributive policies, we use the variation in the degrees of 
redistribution across U.S. states. Since indirect taxes like sales taxes tend to be regressive, 
while income taxes progressive, we measure engagement in redistribution by taking the 
ratio of the share of state government revenues coming from income taxes and the one 
coming from sale taxes and other indirect taxes (using data collected by the U.S. Census 
Bureau). States that redistribute more should exhibit a higher ratio.  
For our key independent variable, we use the average state responses to two 
questions in the General Social Survey. The first two regressions in Table 3 use the 
answers to the question that was described in the previous section: it’s the question about 
how “some think the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences 
between the rich and the poor …” Since we have annual data but the extent of 
redistribution does not vary very much over time we average the data.   
The last two regressions in Table 3 use the answers to a similar question asked 
only in 1987: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in 
income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.” The variable is 
coded 1–5, where a higher number represents stronger preferences for redistribution. We 
                                                 
10  Alesina and Angeletos (2005) show theoretically that differences in beliefs about social justice lead to 
differences in equilibrium redistribution. They also show that different beliefs in what determines 
individual incomes (luck or effort) across countries affects the size of social spending in a country, but do 
not enquire whether differences in beliefs are driven by culture. 
 
  22also control for the state GDP per capita, the size of the population living in the state, and 
the percentage of population that is below the poverty rate.  
The first and third columns of Table 3 provide our ordinary least squares 
estimates. In these regressions, the sign of the coefficient on the preferences variable is 
positive, but the effect is not statistically significant in the first column and is only 
marginally significant in the second column.  
We then use an instrumental variable approach. To obtain our instruments we 
compute the fraction in each state that belong to the various religion denominations and 
the fractions whose ancestors come from the 16 sets of countries and areas listed in the 
previous table. We then run regressions with the dependent variable as one of our two 
measures of the preference for redistribution, to calculate what part of those values can be 
attributed to cultural factors. We then take the estimate coefficients from those 
regressions to predict the preferences variable, and insert those predicted values into the 
regression framework. Using this instrumental variable approach, the estimated 
coefficient of the preference for redistribution on actual redistribution becomes much 
bigger and is marginally statistically significant.  Increasing the intensity of preferences 
for redistribution by one standard deviation raises the ratio of direct/indirect taxation by 
14 percent of the sample mean in the second column or 20 percent of the sample mean in 
the fourth column. The underlying cultural determinants of preferences for redistribution 
do seem to have an impact on the amount of redistribution that occurs, although the 
statistical significance is somewhat weak.  
 4. Culture and Institutions 
If culture affects beliefs and values, it can also have an effect on broader political 
outcomes. In his study of different Italian regions, Putnam (1993) documents a large 
number of positive institutional outcomes associated with higher social capital, like more 
efficient health care systems.  Social capital, at least as intended by Putnam, can be seen 
as a combination of values (people feel a moral duty to go and vote) and beliefs (I expect 
to be ostracized by my community if I behave in an un-civic way).     
Another suggestive example is provided by Licht et al. (2004). They focus on 
three cultural trade-offs:  between embeddedness and autonomy, between hierarchy and 
  23egalitarianism, and between mastery and harmony with nature. By using survey 
responses of elementary and high school teachers in 53 countries (Schwartz, 1999, 2004), 
they document that countries more tilted in favor of autonomy, egalitarianism, and 
mastery exhibit higher rule of law, less corruption, and more democratic accountability. 
To control for the possibility of reverse causality, Licht et al. (2004) adopt an intriguing 
strategy -- they use the grammar of pronouns as an instrumental variable. They argue that 
languages which require the explicit use of `I’ or `you’ signals that a person is 
highlighted and autonomy is valued.  Conversely, languages that allow dropping the 
pronoun emphasize the contextualization of the person and thus reflect a more embedded 
culture. Thus, they argue that this grammatical difference can serve as an instrument for a 
society’s degree of embeddedness or autonomy. While this is only a partial fix (one 
instrument for their three endogenous variables), it is potentially a very interesting 
strategy to capture long-term characteristics of a country’s culture.
11  
Both these papers, however, do not show that the effects of culture on institutions 
have an economic payoff. Evidence in this direction is provided by Tabellini (2005). He 
measures culture as the “principal component” of four values: trust, beliefs in the 
importance of individual effort, generalized morality, and obedience (which he considers 
a negative value), which are inferred from questions on the World Values Survey.  In this 
methodology, the principal component can be understood as a variable underlying these 
four values, in such a way that the variance of the culture with these factors is minimized. 
He then uses a measure of education and of historical political institutions across 69 
European regions as his measure of culture. He finds that the quality of the historical 
institutions (such as constraints on the executives) has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on today’s social values.   He documents that both GDP per capita and 
growth are higher in those regions that exhibit higher levels of the “good” cultural values 
like trust, beliefs in individual effort, generalized morality, and low obedience. More 
importantly, the effect is bigger when he uses an instrumental variable approach and first 
predicts the four values with their historical determinants, before carrying out the 
                                                 
11 La Porta et al. (1999) and Stulz and Williamson (2003), instead, use a reduced-form approach and relate 
the religious composition of a country to the quality of its government and the forms of creditors’ law. 
Similarly, Muller and Philippon (2005) show that the religion composition affects the quality of labor 
relations, which in turn affect corporate ownership concentration.  
  24principal component methodology and creating a culture variable. This evidence strongly 
suggests that “better” cultural values do have a large economic payoff.    
Conclusion 
Sociologists and anthropologists (e.g., Richerson and Boyd, 2005) have 
accumulated a wealth of field evidence on the impact of culture on economic behavior. 
As one of many examples, Salamon (1992), documents that in southern Illinois, in spite 
of the similarity of environmental conditions, towns inhabited by descendents of German-
Catholic who settled in the 1840s and towns inhabited by descendents of Yankee settlers 
from other parts of the United States (mainly Kentucky, Ohio and Indiana) showed 
substantial differences in the structure of land ownership, farming practices, choice of 
crops, and female fertility. German-Catholics almost never sold their land and had on 
average more children, and thus tend to grow crops that are more labor-intensive to 
employ their children.  Yankees saw farming as a business, bought and sold land more 
often, grew less labor-intensive crops such as corn, and had fewer children. Interestingly, 
while Yankees were generally more profitable, the German-Catholic model did not 
become less prevalent after more than a century, because of the higher fertility of German 
Catholics. Not only did culture have an effect, but this effect persisted over time in spite 
of its lower profitability.   
In recent years, economists have begun to apply their analytical frameworks and 
empirical tools to the issue of culture and economic outcomes. Better techniques and 
expanded data have made it possible to identify systematic differences in people’s 
preferences. As this paper documents, cultural hypotheses can be rigorously tested and 
are economically important for fundamental economic issues like national rates of saving. 
  As this research on culture and economic outcomes expands, it raises an exciting 
set of questions. How does culture emerge and how does it persist? What roles are played 
by production technology, political power, efficiency concerns, and even factors like 
hygienic considerations? What determines the persistence of the cultural traits? What is 
the interaction between culture and formal institutions? Importing cultural elements will 
make economic discourse richer, better able to capture the nuances of the real world, and 
ultimately more useful.    
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  29Figure 1 
Effect of Religion on Trust 
19.6% Religious







-6%  20%  -1% 5% 10% 15%
The patterns denote:
Significant Not significant  
Source: European Values Survey and World Values Survey 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1995-1997 (ICPSR 
2790); Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003), tables 2 and 4. 
Note: The bars represent the effect of religious affiliation on trust in percent of the sample mean of trust 
and relatively to “no religious affiliation”. Effects are obtained from a regression where the dependent 
variable is “trust in others”, which equals to 1 if participants report that most people can be trusted. Besides 
religious affiliation dummies, the regression also includes demographic controls (health, male, age, 
education, social class, income; coefficients not reported), a dummy variable equal to 1 if a person does not 
believe in God, country fixed effects, and survey-year dummies.  
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Percentage of Average Trust
The patterns denote:
Significant Not significant  
Source: General Social Survey.  
Note: The bars represent the effect of different ethnic background on trust in percent of the sample mean of 
trust and relatively to “people with ancestors from the Great Britain”, the excluded group. Effects are 
obtained from a regression where the dependent variable is “trust in others”, i.e. a dummy variable equal to 
one if the respondent answered that most people can be trusted. Besides the ethnic origin dummies, the 
regression also includes demographic controls (health, gender, age, education, race), and religious 
affiliations (the omitted category is no religion and atheists). To identify the origin of the ancestors we use 
the answer to the question “From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?” and 
grouped together several countries of origin, as listed in the figure.  
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Source: World Values Survey, General Social Survey 
Note: On the horizontal axis we report the difference between the average trust of each group of countries 
in Figure 2 and the average trust of Great Britain, computed using data from the World Value Survey. On 
the vertical axis we report the estimated effect of each ethnic group on trust, as reported in Figure 2.   
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Percentage of Average Effect
 
The patterns denote:
Significant Not significant  
Source: General Social Survey.  
Note: The bars represent estimated effects of various religious affiliations on preference for redistribution 
in percent of the average value of the dependent variable and relatively to the “no religious affiliation”, the 
excluded group. Effects are obtained from regression estimates where the dependent variable is the answer 
to the following question; “Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the 
income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by 
giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with 
reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. […] What score between 1 and 7 comes 
closest to the way you feel?”  A higher number means stronger preferences for redistribution. Besides 
religion affiliation dummies the regression also includes demographic controls (health, gender, age, 
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Source: General Social Survey.  
Note: The bars represent the effect of ethnic origin on preference for redistribution in percent of the average 
sample value of preference for redistribution and relatively to people with ancestors from Great Britain, the 
excluded group. Effects are computed from regressions where the left hand side variable is preference for 
redistribution. To identify the origin of the ancestors we use the answer to the question “From what 
countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?” and grouped together several countries of origin. 
Preference for redistribution is the answer to the following question; “Some people think that the 
government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps 
by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the 
government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. 
[…] What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?”  A higher number means stronger 
preferences for redistribution. Besides the ethnic origin dummies, the regression includes demographic 
controls (health, gender, age, education, and race), religious affiliations (the omitted category is no religion 
and atheists) and dummy variables that indicate the origin of the ancestors of the respondent. 
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Table 1 
Probability of becoming and entrepreneur 
 Self  Employed 
 OLS  OLS  IV 
Trust  0.0151*** 0.0167*** 0.2380*** 
 (0.0043)  (0.0046)  (0.0591) 
Respondent  is  male  0.0708*** 0.0697*** 0.0659*** 
 (0.0040)  (0.0043)  (0.0052) 
Respondent is white  0.0438***  0.0435***  -0.0037 
 (0.0048)  (0.0051)  (0.0141) 
Age of the respondent  0.0055***  0.0049***  0.0029*** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0011) 
Age of the respondent - squared  -0.0000***  -0.0000***  -0.0000** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Education -0.0096***  -0.0068*  -0.0173*** 
 (0.0032)  (0.0035)  (0.0048) 
Education squared  0.0004***  0.0003**  0.0004** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0002) 
Income deciles dummies  NO  YES  NO 
Observations  26,326 22,791 17,718 
Source: General Social Survey.  
Note:   The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is a self-employed.  The 
sample is restricted to respondents who report to be employed. ‘Trust” is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the respondent answered that most people can be trusted to the question: “Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in life?” The regressions also include 
demographic controls (gender, age, education, and race). In column (2) the instruments are the religious 
denominations and the country of origin of the ancestors. Robust standard errors in parentheses account for 
clustering at country level. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% 
level, and * at the 10 % level. 
  35Table 2 
Effects of culture on savings 
  National savings over GDP 
 OLS  OLS  IV 
Do you consider to be especially important    13.7014**  28.5369* 
to encourage children to learn thrift and savings?    (5.1744)  (16.0549) 
Real growth rate of per capita GDP  1.4550***  0.9814**  0.4686 
 (0.4188)  (0.4334)  (0.7008) 
Dependency ratio  -0.6096***  -0.5741***  -0.5357*** 
 (0.1621)  (0.1534)  (0.1708) 
Dummy if the country is not an OECD country  0.5561  0.5457  0.5345 
 (2.0991)  (1.9788)  (2.1449) 
Government savings (CCG saving: % of GNDI)  0.4199**  0.4377**  0.4569** 
 (0.2012)  (0.1898)  (0.2067) 
Observations 53  53  53 
R-squared 0.581  0.636  0.572 
 
 
Source: World Bank. See Giavazzi, Jappelli,, Pagano (2000) and World Values Survey 1981-1984, 1990-
1993, and 1995-1997 (ICPSR 2790) and The World Christian Database (1990). 
Note: The dependent variable is National Savings over GDP. “Important to encourage children to learn 
thrift and savings?” is based on the answer to the question: “Here is a list of qualities that children can be 
encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?” We coded the 
variable as 1 if the respondent lists as important ‘‘Thrift, saving money and things’’ and we took the 
country’s average response. All the regressions include real growth rate of per capita GDP, a dependency 
ratio (the sum of the country’s population over 65 and population under 15 over total population), a dummy 
for non OECD countries, and a measure of government savings). In column (3) the instruments are the 
percentage of people belonging to various religious denominations in each country. The denominations are 
Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, Jewish, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and other affiliations. Standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis.*** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and * at the 10 % level. 
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Effects of culture on income redistribution 
  Direct over indirect revenues 
 OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Population living in the state  0.7975  0.8042  0.6882  0.6796 
 (0.8119)  (0.8090)  (0.7795)  (0.7575) 
Percentage of population below the  -0.0351*** -0.0359*** -0.0298** -0.0316** 
poverty rate  (0.0119)  (0.0125)  (0.0125)  (0.0134) 
Gdp Procapita in the State  -0.0002  -0.0006  0.0027  0.0019 
 (0.0047)  (0.0048)  (0.0058)  (0.0062) 
Should the government reduce   0.4423**  0.4762**     
income differentials? (1-7)  (0.2075)  (0.2318)     
It is the government responsibility      0.4481**  0.6265** 
to reduce differences in income? (1-5)      (0.1898)  (0.2340) 
Observations 45  45  45  45 
R-squared 0.152  0.151  0.176  0.161 
 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic 
Supplements 
 
Note:  The dependent variable is the ratio of total State income taxes and the sum of all the state 
indirect taxes (sales taxes, taxes on motor vehicles, and other indirect taxes).  “Should the government 
reduce income differentials” is based on the state average answer to the following question; “Some 
people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the 
rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to 
the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income 
difference between the rich and the poor. […] What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way 
you feel?”  A higher number means stronger preferences for redistribution.  We calculated the year-
state average in years 1980, 1983,  1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991,  1993, 1994, 1996, and 
1998, years for which the percentage of population in the state below the poverty rate is available. 
The variable “Is it the government responsibility to reduce differences in income?” is based to the 
state average answer to the following question “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce 
the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.” The 
question was asked in 1987. The variable is coded 1–5, where a higher number represents stronger 
preferences for redistribution. In columns (2) and (4) the instruments are the percentage of people 
belonging to various religious denominations in the states and average percentage of people in the 
state who has ancestors from each of the origin. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** 
indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10 % 
level. 
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